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Overview 
In the early 20th century, two European powers dominated the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), trans-
forming ‘the Arab world’ into a system of separate states and facilitating the establishment of a Jewish home-
land that became the state of Israel, before retreating in the face of independence movements. By the end of the 
century, the United States was unrivalled power-broker across the region, but the Europeans had turned old 
imperialist relationships into commercial ones. Bound to MENA by economic interdependence and migration 
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flows, the European Union formulated a series of initiatives designed to address new transnational security 
concerns through the deployment of ‘soft power’, in conjunction with partial involvement in increased US mil-
itary engagement in the region—with mixed results. By 2011 and the eruption of popular uprisings across the 
Arab world, the European Union was itself in the throws of an economic crisis that forced a rethink in Europe-
an policies toward the region and a reassertion of bilateralism. This chapter traces this evolution in relations 
between the two contiguous regions, noting the interplay between changes in both; it outlines the role of the 
European Union in the quest to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict; and it concludes with European responses to 
the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ and ensuing challenges to regional stability. 
Introduction 
There are four discernible phases to the story of Europe and the Middle East in the last hundred years. The 
first, spanning the First World War and collapse of the Ottoman Empire to the 1950s, is the era of European 
imperialism in the Middle East, out of which was born the contemporary state system in the region. (See 
Box 17.1 for a chronology.) 
<START BOX 17.1> 
Box 17.1 European imperialism and the emergence of the state system 
1800s Britain establishes semi-colonial role (responsible for external relations) in Arab Gulf 
sheikhdoms (Kuwait, the last to join the British ‘trucial system’, is first to gain independence 
in 1961; others—United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain—gain independence in 1971) 
 Separate arrangements are made in Sultanate of Oman (replaced with treaty in 1971) and 
South Arabia (Yemen), with Aden a British colony (until evacuated in 1967) 
1834–1962 Algeria becomes a colony of France (independent in 1962) 
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1881 Tunisia becomes a French protectorate (independent in 1956) 
1882 Britain takes control of Egypt (officially ends role in 1936, but retains presence until 1950s) 
1899 Sudan made an ‘Anglo-Egyptian condominium’ 
1906 Discovery of oil in Iran; foundation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
1911 Italy takes Libya from the Ottomans (independent, with extended British involvement, in 
1951) 
1912 Morocco, previously under French and Spanish areas of control, is made a French 
protectorate, with administration in north ceded to Spain (independent in 1956) 
1919 Attempted imposition of Anglo-Persian Agreement 
1920–23 France acquires the League of Nations mandate for Syria (independent in 1946), from which 
it separates Lebanon (officially independent in 1943, French left in 1946) 
 Britain gains the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia (Iraq); establishes Hashemite 
monarchies in Transjordan (separated from Mandatory remit) and Iraq (independent in 1932; 
monarchy overthrown in 1958); rules Palestine effectively as a colony, within which a 
‘Jewish homeland’ takes shape on the basis of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, as stipulated 
under the mandate 
1941 Allied invasion of Iran: Britain in south; Soviets in north; abdication of Reza Shah, 
succession of Muhammad Reza Shah 
1945–46 British and Soviets withdraw from Iran 
1948 Britain withdraws from the Palestine mandate—establishment of the State of Israel; West 
Bank incorporated in Jordan; Gaza Strip under Egyptian administration until Israel captures 
both in 1967 war 
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1951-3 Nationalization of Iranian oil; diplomatic relations with Britain severed; Britain assists CIA-
instigated coup to overthrow Mussadiq/National Front government, reinstate Shah, and 
reverse oil nationalization 
1956 Suez crisis 
<END BOX 17.1> 
The second coincides with the cold war, during which Europe was part of the Western camp, but the 
United States unilaterally increased its power and influence in the Middle East as Britain and France retreat-
ed. While superpower rivalry was the dominant motif during the cold war, with independent and in most 
cases militaristic regional states playing off one against the other, the subtext was rivalry between the West-
ern powers for commercial gain. 
The third, post-cold-war, period dates from the beginning of the 1990s to 2010, during which time the 
European Union came into being—briefly challenging US ‘hard power’ with its ‘soft power’ approach to 
regional developments. The EU member states set about devising a common foreign and security policy to-
ward their neighbours in the Mediterranean, including a coordinated position on the Israeli–Palestinian con-
flict, but such efforts fell short of turning the EU into a unified actor with decisive influence across the Mid-
dle East writ large. Crucially, EU members differed in their reactions to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The 
ensuing conflict in Iraq, inclusive of sectarian violence, defied US and allied European efforts to restore en-
during stability and in the case of the British at least, their military performance in Iraq was deemed a fail-
ure. The unravelling of Iraq, only partially contained sufficiently for US troops to withdraw in 2011, was a 
portent of more chaos to come, following the Arab uprisings. 
The fourth phase in the story of European involvement in the Middle East dawned at the end of 2010, 
when the uprising in Tunisia presaged a wave of revolts across the region that took Europe and the US by 
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surprise, and, in conjunction with the legacy of the intervention in Iraq, obliged both to re-examine their pol-
icies and assumptions. 
The analysis offered here draws on a number of theoretical approaches. The literature on imperialism, 
neo-imperialism, and post-colonialism is instructive for understanding: first, early 20th-century European 
predominance in the Middle East; second, subsequent US hegemony in the region; and third, the legacy of 
post-colonialism in contemporary European relations with the Arab and Muslim world. 
Realism comes into its own during the cold-war period, not least in the cynical commentaries of Arab 
columnists as a predictor of not only superpower, but also US–European competition for clients, access to 
resources, and military sales, as well as the paramountcy of military force (Waltz 1979). However, the realist 
and neo-realist paradigms are limiting, in so far as they reinforce the perception that states are rational actors 
calculating and acting upon their interests in a global competition. 
Issues of identity do not feature in the realist paradigm, yet they help to explain the resistance to and na-
ture of anti-imperialism, anti-Westernism, and the Arab revolts. Critical theory (Doty 1996; Fierke 2007) is 
helpful in deconstructing Europe’s depiction of the Middle East and its counter-terrorism policy, and related 
efforts to control migration (Basaran 2008). Recent examinations of narrative construction and multicultur-
alism, deploying discourse analysis, offer perhaps important insights on the contemporary phenomenon of 
radicalization in Europe, as well as the Middle East (Roy 2004; Croft 2012). Meanwhile, theories of region-
alism in world politics are instructive in identifying how regions take shape, not only internally, but also in 
relation to one another. 
The contention here is that while imperialism was done to the Middle East by Europe, the experience has 
shaped Europe as well as the regions colonized, and the process is dynamic. The contemporary identity of 
the EU has been, and continues to be, defined in relation to neighbouring regions, as well as in juxtaposition 
to the US. Its culture and politics are also informed by Europe’s secular and Christian heritage, and the pres-
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ence within of Muslim émigré communities alongside Jewish Europeans, with links including family ties to 
the Arab world and Israel, respectively. 
By the same token, initiatives to develop regional institutions and consciousness in the Middle East, as 
discussed in Chapter 9, have met with limited results, despite a rare indication of assertiveness from the 
League of Arab States (LAS) in the context of the Libyan revolt, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) me-
diation in the Yemeni crisis and Bahrain. Meanwhile, as of 2011, it is clear that the US, even with EU sup-
port, is incapable of imposing order on a region overtaken by competing transnational and sub-national ac-
tors and forces. 
In economic terms, the MENA region is the periphery and Europe the core. In the 1990s, when globali-
zation became the fashionable paradigm, theorists puzzled over whether the Middle East region as a whole 
and the Arab economies in particular had somehow been left behind in a global liberalization trend. Europe-
an policy initiatives, especially in the Mediterranean, promoted liberal market capitalism, yet could find no 
alternative when parallel economic crises overtook the EU as well as MENA from 2009, and populist voices 
gathered momentum. 
Social theory and constructivism are of use here in explaining how depictions of the problems can vary 
so profoundly from region to region, across and within societies (Wendt 1999: 157–90; Fierke 2007: 75–98). 
It helps to alert the scholar to the coexistence of contrasting world views and ‘narratives’, which serve a 
purpose for their proponents, but cannot be reconciled. By 2015 the Europeans were uncertain about the fu-
ture of the EU itself, yet clung onto their traditional advocacy of human rights, civil society activism and 
free speech, while seemingly powerless to stop a resurgence of dictatorship in the Middle East. 
Phase I: the imperial era and its legacy 
Early 20th-century European imperialism in the Middle East was almost entirely a British and French en-
deavour, but the legacy of this period informs contemporary thinking about Europe’s role in the region. 
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Their period of dominance spawned a lasting resentment and/or suspicion of external interference. More im-
portantly, these powers were responsible between them for devising the map of the Middle Eastern state sys-
tem in the aftermath of the First World War which appeared durable until directly challenged by the self-
styled ‘Islamic State’ (IS) in 2014. (For a list of the milestone dates in the evolution of the state system, see 
Box 17.1.) 
Imperial interests 
British and French imperial policies were derivative of their global ambitions and interests. Britain initially 
sought access to coastal ports along the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea littorals, to protect the 
communication routes to its imperial possessions in India and beyond. The building of the Suez Canal, 
which opened a new sea route from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, was a French, and later a British, 
business venture. It presaged progressive British interference in Egypt and protection of the canal was cited 
as a reason for British designs on Palestine in the early 20th century. 
Britain’s decision to convert its navy from steam to oil was made at the beginning of the 20th century, 
and prompted its quest to control access to the oil resources of Iran and the Ottoman-controlled province of 
Mosul (subsequently part of Iraq). Even before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, therefore, the scene was 
set for a century of competition between the major oil companies, and thus the governments of Britain, 
France, and the US. 
French ambitions in North Africa were more about extending the francophone empire than securing 
trade routes. French colonization of Algeria, begun in 1830, lasted until 1962—leaving the Algerians with 
an identity crisis post-independence. Morocco and Tunisia were made protectorates for several decades. The 
French interest in the Levant, meanwhile, had in part to do with proprietorial connections to the Christian 
(mainly Maronite) community in the Lebanon, as well as competition with the British. 
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The way in which the British and French manoeuvred and schemed to carve up Ottoman domains even 
before that empire had collapsed gave them a reputation for double-dealing. Three sets of documents, dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, bear witness to the machinations that took place,1 and are important because they are 
cited by Arabs to this day as evidence of European interference and perfidy. First, the exchange of letters 
between Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, and Sharif Hussein of Mecca, from July 
1915 to January 1916 (the Hussein–McMahon correspondence), encouraged Hashemite leadership of an Ar-
ab revolt in return for British recognition and support for Arab independence, including in areas that eventu-
ally came under British and French mandatory rule from 1920. 
Second, in January 1916, a secret agreement negotiated during the previous year between Sir Mark 
Sykes for the British and François Georges-Picot for the French (the Sykes–Picot Agreement) provided for 
British and French spheres of influence and control across whole swathes of the Ottoman Empire, including 
in those areas that subsequently became the League of Nations mandates of Syria/Lebanon, Iraq, and Pales-
tine. In its specifics, this deal undercut the British understandings reached with Sharif Hussein. 
Third, in a letter dated 2 November 1917 from the British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour to Lord Roth-
schild, the British minister stated: 
Her Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the 
Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this objective, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of ex-
isting non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any 
other country. 
The ‘Balfour Declaration’, and by extension the British, are still held responsible among Arabs for enabling 
the creation of the state of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, and thus generating the Arab–Israeli con-
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flict. The records suggest that the British did not foresee the difficulties that they would encounter in manag-
ing Jewish immigration to Palestine or the eventual outcome. 
After 1920, Palestine and Iraq were established as separate entities, administered by the British as 
League of Nations mandates on the way to independent statehood. France took responsibility for what be-
came the states of Syria and Lebanon. British acquiescence enabled the emergence of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, at the expense of the Hashemite emirate in the Hijaz. By way of partial recompense, the British in-
stalled Hashemite monarchs in what became Transjordan and Iraq. 
These arrangements meant that the Arabs of the Levant and Mesopotamia transited from subjects of the 
Ottoman caliphate to citizens in the client states of the European victors of the First World War. The new 
borders cut across pre-existing age-old lines of communication, administration, kinship, and association. 
Iraq had previously been three Ottoman provinces, not one entity. In the Eastern Mediterranean, economic 
links had grown up that tied a string of port cities to the towns in the interior rather than to each other, but 
the mandate system separated coastal communities from those in the interior. 
Thus it was that European imperialism came to take the blame for dividing up the Arab world, and for 
setting up a competitive state system that undercut Arab unity and produced militarist, undemocratic and 
client regimes thereafter. In the popular Arab narrative, this was an imperial plot to divide and rule, which 
the Americans stand accused of perpetuating subsequently.  
Phase II: imperial retreat and cold war rivalries 
Nationalist backlash 
From their inception, in the Arab states the rallying cry became Arab nationalism and independence. Post-
independence governments espoused anti-imperialist credentials to bolster their legitimacy. In Algeria, for 
example, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) based decades of political dominance on its leadership of 
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the liberation from France. The republicans who murdered the Iraqi king in 1958 overthrew not only the 
monarchy, but also related British influence. 
The British retreated from mandate Palestine in 1948 in the face of two nationalist movements, the aspi-
rations of which they had failed to reconcile. They had repressed Arab opposition to Jewish immigration, but 
also fell foul of the Zionist movement by attempting to limit the inflow of Jewish migrants. The rise of Na-
zism and thence the Holocaust in Europe meant that British attempts to block the entry to Palestine of Jews 
fleeing systematic extermination was indefensible and widely criticized, not least in Washington. Various 
formulae were mooted for partitioning Palestine between Jews and Arabs, culminating in the United Nations 
partition plan of 1947 (UN General Assembly Resolution 181). This was accepted by the Jewish leadership, 
but rejected by the Arabs. 
Lacking the will or the wherewithal, in the aftermath of the Second World War, to implement the UN 
plan by force, the British simply packed up and left. As they did so, the first Arab–Israeli war, resulting in 
the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, decided the issue. For the Palestinians, the majority of whom 
became refugees, the legacy of the British mandate was a catastrophe. For the Israelis, there was no love for 
the British and a fierce sense that their very survival depended on self-reliance. 
The ultimate humiliation for the British and French came in 1956, when they secretly colluded with the 
Israelis to seize control of the Suez Canal, nationalized by Egyptian President and hero of Arab nationalism, 
Gamal Abd al-Nasser, and to overthrow his government. Furious at their deception, the US administration 
ordered their immediate withdrawal. To press home the point, the US triggered a run on the pound sterling 
that was so serious that it forced the British to comply, leaving the French and Israelis with no choice but to 
follow suit. 
France saw Nasser as the inspiration behind resistance to French rule in Algeria. The British encountered 
opposition to their colony in Aden from rebels assisted by Nasser. In both cases, the imperialists were ulti-
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mately driven out. In Britain’s case, the subsequent departure from the Arab sheikhdoms of the lower Gulf 
was achieved relatively peacefully, by negotiation, in 1971. That finally was the last step in Europe’s impe-
rial retreat from the Middle East. 
Oil wealth and commercial competition 
The year 1971 was also the moment at which the oil-producing states of the region nationalized their oil in-
dustries, ending half a century of predominance of the Western oil companies in the energy sector and their 
control over price levels. The ensuing rise in oil prices, coupled with the Arab embargo on oil sales to West-
ern countries supporting Israel in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, delivered a profound shock to the developed 
economies. Meanwhile, the oil booms of the mid-1970s and early 1980s fuelled a spending spree in the oil-
producing states, from which European contractors and suppliers of consumer goods and arms competed to 
benefit. The international banking system absorbed surplus Arab capital. 
Cold-war rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union encompassed both the Persian Gulf and the Ar-
ab–Israeli confrontation zone (Reich 1987). Even though the US came to Nasser’s rescue during the Suez 
War, its reluctance to finance the Aswan High Dam project or to supply arms led Egypt to turn to the Soviet 
bloc. Thus began a period of superpower rivalry in the Arab–Israeli conflict, which saw the US take over 
from France as the principle arms supplier to Israel, and the Soviet Union siding with the Arab republics of 
Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. 
The Shah of Iran, who owed his throne to British and US connivance in the coup of 1953 that ended both 
the republican government of Mohammad Mussadiq and nationalization of Iranian oil production, became 
the principle US ally and proxy policeman in the Gulf. After the British withdrew their forces from the Per-
sian Gulf in 1971, Washington built up the Shah’s Iran as a bulwark against Soviet expansion and sold him 
whatever arms he asked for. Saudi Arabia was the other pillar in US Gulf policy. 
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In the shadow of the US 
Since the Israelis were effective in lobbying against the US sale of some high-tech weaponry sought by the 
Saudis, Britain had Washington’s blessing to make up the difference. This arrangement was behind the Brit-
ish Al Yamamah defence sales contract with Saudi Arabia, which kept production lines of the British Tor-
nado aircraft running pending the development of the Eurofighter. The British–Saudi deal was worth billions 
of pounds over several years and formed the bedrock of bilateral relations into the 21st century, when a fol-
low-up deal for (Eurofighter) Typhoons was forged. 
In fierce competition with the Americans and British, French arms manufacturers ranked third as suppli-
ers to the Arab Gulf states, and alongside the Soviets they were the principle suppliers to Iraq in the 1980s. 
By this stage, Iraq was at war with Iran. The Iranian revolution that toppled the Shah in 1979 had brought to 
an end Iran’s special relationship with the US and also presaged an upset in relations with Europe, especially 
with the British. Even though Iraq was the instigator of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) and a number of states 
instituted a ban on arms sales to both countries, the Iraqis continued to receive supplies, including covert 
help from both the Americans and the British. 
Following the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Washington moved away 
from a policy of securing its interests in the Gulf, including protection of the free flow of oil, by relying on 
proxies, and became directly involved in patrolling Gulf waters. Washington also gave its backing to the 
mujahedin and Arab volunteers fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan—the precursors of Al Qaeda. 
Meanwhile, in the Arab–Israeli sector, Washington became the principle architect of moves towards 
peace. The treaty between Egypt and Israel of 1979, presaged by the Camp David accords of 1978, was 
bankrolled and sustained by US aid to both parties. Relegated to the sidelines, the Europeans used the vehi-
cle of the European Community to articulate a common stance on the conflict, deemed by both the US and 
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Israel as unwelcome. Meanwhile, the identity of Europe was itself developing, with plans to move from an 
Economic Community to a Union of member states by 1992. 
Phase III: the European Union and regional security 
As the transition from the EC to EU drew nigh, Europe was overtaken by the momentous events surrounding 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, symbolized by the tearing down of the Berlin Wall. This meant a complete 
rethink of defence and security issues, as well as a preoccupation with forging new relationships with former 
Soviet bloc states to the east. 
Concerns about ‘failed states’, refugee flows, gun-running, the drug trade, and all aspects of international 
crime supplanted the old preoccupations of the cold war and the strategic nuclear threat. While the US, the 
sole remaining superpower, could boast the military capacity to police the new world order, the Europeans 
advocated, of necessity, the utility of ‘soft power’, international law, and institution-building as the means to 
contain conflict. 
War, sanctions, and trade 
The scene was set for a decade in which the US and the EU pursued distinct (and complementary) approach-
es to relations with the Middle East. When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the United Nations, Eu-
rope, and the US immediately imposed sanctions on Iraq, but it was the US that took the lead in marshalling 
a massive military force with European backing, UN endorsement, and significant Arab support. After Ku-
wait’s liberation, the US-led coalition forces dispersed, but a US (and small British and French) military 
presence was retained in order to contain both Iraq and Iran (Gause 2010: 127–8). 
For a time, the Europeans went along with the US-led containment of Iraq, including sanctions and 
weapons inspections. Britain and France joined the US in imposing ‘no-fly zones’ over both the Kurdish re-
gion of northern Iraq and in the south, ostensibly to protect the Shia population there, but arguably more to 
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defend Kuwait. The French eventually ended their involvement. Only the British stayed the course and as-
sisted the Americans in several bombing operations, purportedly to force Iraqi compliance with weapons 
inspections, although these were suspended following the Allied Operation Desert Fox in 1998. 
With respect to the Arab Gulf states, the Europeans pursued independent and competitive commercial 
agendas, although the EU instituted a dialogue with the GCC—the alliance that links Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Following the introduction of a GCC customs union, 
the EU–GCC dialogue was expected to deliver a free trade agreement between the two blocs, but disagree-
ments over how this would apply to petroleum products stymied progress. 
During the 1990s, the adoption of a common EU strategy toward Iran proved more productive. The Eu-
ropean approach, which favoured dialogue over isolation, was initially dubbed ‘critical dialogue’ and, after 
the election of reformist President Mohammad Khatami in 1997, progressed to ‘comprehensive engage-
ment’. Having negotiated the restoration of full diplomatic relations with Tehran, Britain was a full partici-
pant in the coordinated EU approach. Khatami made official visits to a number of European capitals, alt-
hough not London, cementing diplomatic, trade, and cultural links. At the end of 2002, negotiations began 
for an EU–Iran trade and cooperation agreement, and a dialogue on human rights was initiated. By this time, 
however, Washington was gearing up for the invasion of Iraq and subsequently, as discussed in the section 
entitled ‘Phase IV: Europe and the Arab uprisings’, EU relations with Iran became preoccupied with the 
issue of Iran’s nuclear programme. 
9/11 and the ‘war on terror’ 
When terrorists attacked in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the Europeans were in the 
forefront of pledges of support for the Americans. The US went on to a war footing and declared a ‘war on 
terror’, to which allies around the world committed support—at least in terms of security and intelligence 
cooperation. 
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Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) offered to assist the anticipated US repris-
als against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, although the Americans initially preferred to go it alone, with some 
British assistance. British Prime Minister Tony Blair capitalized on Britain’s improved access in Iran to help 
to secure Tehran’s cooperation in Afghanistan. Germany hosted an international gathering in Bonn, intended 
to lay the ground for a new democratic polity in Kabul following the fall of the Taliban. 
In due course, most NATO members committed forces and aid to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and 
eventually took overall command of military operations there while US forces concentrated on pursuing Al 
Qaeda fighters, including Osama bin Laden, along the border with Pakistan. The US and the Europeans un-
derestimated the challenges of reconfiguring the politics of Afghanistan in the name of democracy. Mean-
while, Washington switched its focus to Iraq; in January 2002, President Bush named Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea as the ‘axis of evil’. 
As the possibility of a US invasion of Iraq gathered momentum, the Europeans split ranks. The British, 
along with the US State Department, did convince Bush to take his case to the United Nations in September 
2002, and the Security Council agreed Resolution 1441, requiring Iraq to submit to new weapons inspec-
tions. However, these proved inconclusive, and France and Germany refused to support military action in 
the absence of UN authorization. 
Britain sought UN cover for the intervention that Washington had prepared, but eventually opted to join 
US forces in the invasion of March 2003 without UN endorsement. European public opinion was largely 
opposed to the war, although Prime Ministers Berlusconi of Italy and Aznar of Spain sided with Bush and 
sent troops to Iraq following the invasion. The governments of the East European states—lined up to be-
come new EU members, yet equally keen to support the US—also committed forces to the stabilization ef-
fort, but except for the Polish forces, their numbers were comparatively small. 
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Ultimately, the fallout for European unity and EU expansion was damaging, but not fatal. It did, howev-
er, contribute to subsequent timidity in Europe about criticizing Washington’s policies in other parts of the 
Middle East. 
Arab governments were generally fearful that a US success in Iraq could portend a more ambitious US 
agenda for regime change in the region, but when the occupation met increasing Iraqi opposition in early 
2004, fears of a spill over effect in the region loomed larger. Token European support for the rebuilding ef-
fort in Iraq also began to peel away as all foreign nationals there began to fear kidnap, and some were exe-
cuted by the newly emergent Al Qaeda in Iraq and other extremists. After mass attacks on Iraqi civilians 
triggered sectarian warfare in 2006, the US military was left virtually alone to try to restore security. 
In the meantime, a terrorist bombing in Madrid in early 2004, apparently inspired by Al Qaeda, turned 
public opinion there decisively against involvement in Iraq. Yet even though intelligence assessments indi-
cated US policy in Iraq and support for Israel were contributing to the radicalization of Muslim opinion eve-
rywhere, the sense dawned in Europe that the problem was more deep-rooted and at least partly domestic. 
In Britain, suicide bombings on the London transport system, in July 2005, and other incidents perpetrat-
ed by British nationals prompted the government to pass new counter-terrorism legislation and to re-
examine its assumptions about ‘British multiculturalism’. Social tensions in other parts of Europe erupted 
around areas of urban deprivation and across religious divides. The place of Muslims in Europe became the 
subject of heated debate and prejudice, with almost all governments introducing new measures to manage 
immigration, as well as to combat the possibility of terrorism within the EU. 
The Mediterranean neighbourhood 
The EU is the most important destination for exports from the MENA region, and the overall trade balance 
has long been in Europe’s favour, although Europe as a whole is heavily dependent on energy supplies from 
North Africa and the Gulf, and more so than the US. Israel’s primary market is Europe. 
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These economic ties, together with geographic proximity and inward migration from the Arab countries, 
Turkey and Iran, to Europe make for a relationship between the two regions that contrasts with relations be-
tween the Middle East and the more distant US. Reflecting these differences, European policies in the Mid-
dle East concentrated on socio-economic strategies toward their neighbours (Behrendt and Hanelt 2000). 
Thus, in their dealings with each other, the Europeans and the Arabs manoeuvred around the imperatives 
of economic interdependence and attendant security issues in a way that suggests that both were as influ-
enced by political considerations as by economic imperatives. 
In the mid-1990s, the EU embarked on a new initiative for relations with its southern neighbours, which 
was conceived in parallel with its more ambitious arrangements for incorporating former Soviet satellite 
states into the EU. The central objective was the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean economic area, to come 
into effect by 2010. The intention was to dismantle tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured 
products between the EU and neighbouring states on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. 
Taking into account traditional trade flows and existing agricultural policies, trade in agricultural produce 
was also to be progressively liberalized, as was provision of cross-border services and capital movements. 
(A list of successive EU initiatives for the Mediterranean, starting in the 1990s, is provided in Box 17.2.) 
<START BOX 17.2> 
Box 17.2 Europe and the Middle East since the cold war 
1991 Wide European support for sanctions and use of force against Iraq in the Gulf War 
1995 The Barcelona Declaration 
 EU member states, plus Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey, embrace a three-tier agenda for economic, 
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political and cultural, and security cooperation intended to turn the Mediterranean into a more 
integrated region 
 The arrangement becomes known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
1990s Initiation of EU–GCC dialogue encompassing EU members and the Gulf states of Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates envisages the creation of an 
EU–GCC free trade area 
1990s Development of an EU common strategy towards Iran known as ‘critical dialogue’, aims to 
promote political, economic, and cultural links 
2001 Wide European support for the US following 9/11, including NATO support of action in 
Afghanistan 
2002–03 EU participation in ‘the Quartet’ (the EU, US, UN, and Russia) to produce the ‘Road Map’ to 
promote a two-state solution to the Palestine–Israel conflict 
2003 Limited European support for the Iraq invasion (initially supported by Britain, Italy, Spain, and 
East European states) 
2004 Launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) following EU enlargement from fifteen to 
twenty-five members, to complement EMP; ENP applies to EU’s immediate neighbours by land 
or sea, with bilaterally agreed action plans for partner states 
 EU3: a diplomatic initiative involving Britain, France, and Germany to encourage Iran to curb its 
nuclear enrichment programme 
2008 Mediterranean Union: a proposal by French President Sarkozy, builds on the EMP to create a 
new Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), including EU, North African, Balkan and Arab states, 
and Israel 
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2011 Limited EU support for NATO intervention in Libya 
 
<END BOX 17.2> 
In the Barcelona Declaration of 1995,2 the fifteen member states of the EU and Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey embraced a 
three-tier agenda for economic, political and cultural, and security cooperation in the Mediterranean. The 
EU allocated funds to promote new communication and trade links between the Maghreb and the Levant. 
and by 2004 was spending about €1 billion a year on the programme. 
It was counted a notable achievement of this Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) that Syria and Leb-
anon were involved as well as Israel, notwithstanding the unresolved conflict between them. In the mid-
1990s, progress in Middle Eastern peace-making through the Oslo process had been expected to deliver an 
end to the conflict, and the Barcelona initiative was intended both to complement and capitalize on that pro-
cess, but not directly interact with it. As it transpired, the EMP survived the demise of the Oslo process, but 
not without some stormy encounters at ministerial meetings of the participants and the collapse of early ef-
forts at security cooperation across the Arab–Israeli divide. 
By 2003, the broad parameters and shortcomings of the EMP were apparent. Instead of an integrated re-
gion around the Mediterranean, what had emerged was a hub-and-spokes arrangement, with the EU as the 
hub connected to each partner state by bilateral trade links, or spokes (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001). A 
series of bilateral association agreements were concluded between the EU and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, and Tunisia. Negotiations with Syria failed to produce a simi-
lar agreement, complicated in part by a new requirement for partner states to renounce weapons of mass de-
struction. Libya remained under sanctions until Qaddafi’s decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction 
in 2003, and then only accepted observer status in the EMP. 
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The failure of the EMP to transform the Mediterranean into a cohesive new economic area of shared 
prosperity and security cooperation stemmed from the continuation of disputes between the partner states 
(not least the Arab–Israeli conflict), the reluctance of the Arab regimes to adopt the political reforms advo-
cated by Europe, and the persistence of barriers to the free movement of labour around the region, kept in 
place by EU measures to control immigration. In addition, none of the Arab partner states had the capacity 
to match the European Commission in managing the bureaucratic complexities of the relationship. This ena-
bled the EU to set the pace, at least in terms of trade relations, while the partner states feared exposure of 
their fragile domestic industries to European competition. 
Realization of the limited achievements of the EMP led to a rethink and the launch of a new European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. This reflected a decision, in the wake of EU enlargement, to develop 
a comprehensive formula to embrace non-candidate countries around the periphery, the better to enhance 
their stability and prosperity, to mutual benefit. The new policy was also a response to a US initiative to 
promote economic and political reform in what Washington called ‘the Wider Middle East’ (including Paki-
stan and Afghanistan). 
The core concept of the ENP was to complement the EMP with a differentiated approach to bilateral re-
lations with each of Europe’s neighbours, taking account of the size and relative level of development of 
partner economies.3 The EU undertook to assist with indigenously generated reform programmes, and ‘Ac-
tion Plans’ were agreed accordingly with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as 
East European neighbours outside the EU. 
By the end of 2007, however, the Europeans were professing disappointment that their efforts to help to 
combat corruption, to promote accountability and transparency, and to export European norms for human 
rights protection were still failing to meet their aspirations. For the Arab states, the ENP was even less at-
tractive than the EMP, since it offered them only the distant promise of economic benefits as and when they 
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achieved greater harmonization with internal EU standards. Disparities in wealth within the Arab states, as 
well as between the Arab economies and Europe, intensified. 
Running for the French presidency in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy floated a new initiative to complement the 
EMP that led to the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in Paris in 2008 (Bicci and Gillespie 
2011). This proved little more than a repackaging of the concept of partnership, elevated to the intergovern-
mental level, with a joint presidency (initially France and Egypt) and a dedicated secretariat (in Barcelona). 
In substance, it prioritized various joint projects, most already mooted under the EMP, and looked to the pri-
vate sector to deliver funding. In essence, the UfM represented a retreat from the aspirations for the creation 
of a new Mediterranean area of economic cooperation and development espoused in the 1990s. 
Europe and the Middle East peace process 
Individually and collectively, the Europeans have traditionally championed the view that the ‘land for peace’ 
formula that underpinned the Egypt–Israel peace treaty of 1979 offers the best formula for a comprehensive 
peace deal. The concept was adopted by the UN Security Council in the aftermath of the 1967 war in Reso-
lution 242, and repeated in Resolution 338 after the 1973 war. All EC and EU statements on the Arab–Israeli 
conflict thereafter have sought implementation of all relevant UN resolutions, adherence to international 
law, and the exchange of land for peace. 
As of 2002, the EU has formally embraced the goal of a ‘two-state solution’ to the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict, but always with the caveat that this must be achieved by negotiation between the protagonists. In 
practice, also, the Europeans have generally proceeded on the assumption that only the US has the leverage 
necessary to bring the contending parties to agreement. 
In 1980, the European Community demonstrated both unity and prescience when it issued the Venice 
Declaration,4 calling for the Palestinian people to be able ‘to exercise fully their right to self-determination’ 
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and stating that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would have to be involved in peace negotia-
tions. 
For several years, the Venice Declaration formed the basis of the European stance on the conflict, but the 
US was the peace broker. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the US adopted the lead in me-
diation efforts, including the evacuation of the PLO leadership from Beirut to Tunis. Europe called for Isra-
el’s unconditional withdrawal in accordance with UN Resolution 425 (of 1978). Israel did pull back its forc-
es to southern Lebanon, but then remained there until 2000. 
Meanwhile, when the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, erupted in Gaza and the West Bank in December 
1987, European opinion was shocked by television coverage of Israel’s military response to stone-throwing 
Palestinians. The European Parliament voted to deny finalization of three protocols on Israel’s trade and fi-
nancial relations with the EC. The Parliament also criticized conditions set by Israel for implementation of 
an EC provision for direct trade between Palestinians and Europe. The move achieved an alleviation of those 
conditions prior to passage of the protocols later in the year.5 
The tactic of delaying approval of bureaucratic instruments affecting trade with Israel was to be used on 
subsequent occasions, as a way in which to convey European disapproval of Israeli policies in relation to the 
Palestinians. For example, ratification of Israel’s partnership agreement with the EU, reached in 1995 under 
the EMP, was held up the following year to signal dissatisfaction with the policy of the Netanyahu govern-
ment (which took office in 1996) with respect to the peace process. However, over the years such moves 
have not affected the trajectory of Israel’s settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusa-
lem and under the ENP Israel has attained ever closer economic relations with the EU. In effect, the EU has 
pursued a twin track approach of improving ties to Israel while also criticising its policies on the Palestini-
ans. 
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The Europeans were given only observer status at the November 1991 Madrid Conference that launched 
the peace process following the Gulf War. However, the conference gave birth to both bilateral and multilat-
eral tracks, and the EC was made convener of the working group dealing with regional economic develop-
ment. For the duration of the multilaterals process—which eventually ceased because of problems on the 
bilateral tracks—the EU used this platform to take a number of initiatives, including commissioning a World 
Bank report that laid the basis for an economic aid and development plan for the West Bank and Gaza 
(World Bank 1993). 
Under the Oslo process, initiated in 1993, the EU became the largest single donor to the Palestinian Au-
thority. The US administration kept to itself management of actual peace negotiations, but acknowledged 
that the whole process was facilitated by the EU role. Nonetheless, neither the Americans nor the Europeans 
were able to save the peace process when the make-or-break summit at Camp David in July 2000 collapsed 
without agreement and the second intifada ensued. Under the premiership of Ariel Sharon, from February 
2001, the conflict raged anew, with Palestinian suicide attacks in Israel reaching unprecedented levels and 
the Israelis reoccupying Palestinian autonomous areas in spring 2002. 
The EU did not support the decision of the Bush administration to boycott and sideline PLO Chairman 
Yasser Arafat, and emergency aid from the EU kept the Palestinian Authority afloat when US assistance was 
suspended. Responding pragmatically to US President Bush’s endorsement of a two-state solution to the 
conflict, in spring 2002, the EU worked through the mechanism of ‘the Quartet’ (the EU, the US, the UN, 
and Russia) to produce the ‘Road Map’, formally launched in 2003, spelling out steps to reach that goal. 
Responding to Hamas 
While the EU, along with other members of the Quartet, continued to cite the Road Map as the recipe for 
peace, Sharon preferred a unilateralist strategy, and evacuated Israeli settlements and troops from Gaza in 
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2005. The EU then took the initiative of organizing new Palestinian legislative elections, held in January 
2006. 
Contrary to expectations in Europe and Washington, the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas won a 
clear victory. This presented a problem for the EU, since it had included Hamas in a list of terrorist organi-
zations and EU law prevented Brussels from funding such groups. The Quartet called on Hamas to renounce 
violence, to accept agreements previously reached by the Palestinian leadership, and to recognize Israel. In 
the meantime, Brussels introduced a temporary mechanism to funnel aid to vital service personnel in the 
West Bank and Gaza. 
In summer 2006, Israel launched an offensive on the Gaza Strip to counter Palestinian attacks into Israel, 
but the ensuing battle was soon overtaken by war on the Israeli–Lebanese front triggered by a raid across the 
Israeli border by Hezbollah. Most European governments pressed for an early ceasefire, while the US and 
Britain initially held out for the defeat of Hezbollah, which the Israeli armed forces proved unable to deliver.  
Hezbollah won plaudits from around the Arab world for its readiness to take on the Israelis and survive. 
The links between Hezbollah, its patrons Syria and Iran, and Hamas were enhanced, and after Hamas won 
sole control of the Gaza Strip following a showdown with the rival Fatah organization in 2007, Hamas was 
able to survive the blockade imposed by Israel by means of aid from Iran, among others. The EU denounced 
the Israeli blockade on Gaza as ‘collective punishment’, but proved powerless to lift or circumvent it. At the 
end of 2008, Israel launched another offensive to curtail Hamas rocket attacks from Gaza, in which more 
than 1,300 Palestinians and thirteen Israelis died. This time, the Europeans were united in criticizing the Is-
raeli use of force as ‘disproportionate’. 
In the meantime, the EU focused on helping a reconstituted Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to 
develop the infrastructure of a state, including new police and security forces. Washington took the lead on 
renewed peace negotiations, excluding Hamas. However, even when President Barack Obama took office in 
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2009 and reinvigorated US efforts to achieve a ‘two-state’ agreement, his strategy foundered over the issue 
of settlement expansion in the occupied territories. 
In a statement issued by the EU Council of Ministers at the end of 2009, just before the European Exter-
nal Action Service (EEAS) came into being and Catherine Ashton was appointed the new EU foreign policy 
chief, the Europeans spelled out their position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in detail (Council of the Eu-
ropean Union 2009). The statement was explicit on the illegality of the Israeli occupation and the need for it 
to end. Yet little was said thereafter by the EU to articulate ways in which Europe might hold Israel, or the 
Palestinians, to account for their actions and transgressions. Another round of war on the Israeli-Gaza front 
in November 2012 left 167 Palestinians and 6 Israelis dead. 
A new attempt by the US to rejuvenate negotiations during Obama’s second term, led by Secretary of 
State John Kerry, collapsed in April 2014. This time, the US was more inclined than ever before to hold Is-
rael primarily responsible. The following summer the Israelis engaged Hamas in a more prolonged and dev-
astating war in which over 2,000 Gazan Palestinians, 66 Israeli soldiers and seven Israeli civilians were 
killed. Various donors, including the EU and Arab states, pledged support for the rebuilding of Gaza, but by 
early 2015 only a fraction of what was pledged had been spent. Meanwhile, the Palestinians took their cause 
to the UN but, having won recognition as a ‘non-member observer state’ in November 2012, their bid for 
recognition as an independent state was defeated by the UN Security Council in December 2014.  The EU 
Parliament, as too the parliaments of several EU member states, did vote for such recognition of Palestinian 
statehood, but still held to the position that this should come about as the result of agreement with the Israe-
lis. 
Phase IV: Europe and the Arab uprisings 
EU relations with the Middle East entered a new phase in 2010, as a result of several factors. By then, Eu-
rope was in the grips of the financial crisis that has dominated the agenda of the EU and its member states 
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ever since, relegating other issues, including relations with the Middle East, to the periphery. Deferring to 
Washington to lead on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the EU had no alternatives to offer when US 
efforts faltered.  EU initiatives for the Mediterranean, from the EMP to the ENP and then the UfM did not 
deliver the reforms in the Arab states that they were intended to encourage. Part of the problem was that the 
Europeans had used the ENP action plans to oblige Arab governments to control migration in Europe’s in-
terests to the detriment of human rights (Basaran 2008).  
Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic of Iran, under an increasingly hardline leadership, aligned with Syria, 
Hezbollah, and Hamas, and on friendly terms with a Shia-dominated government in Iraq, looked poised to 
become the new regional hegemon, in defiance of the US and its regional allies. Simultaneously, the Euro-
peans had come round to the US position on the Iranian nuclear issue, fearing that Tehran was developing 
the capability to turn its civil nuclear programme into a military one. When the various incentives offered to 
Iran by Britain, Germany, and France—the so-called ‘EU3’— failed to persuade Iran to suspend its nuclear 
enrichment programme, the US became more directly involved and the issue was taken to the UN Security 
Council. 
UN-imposed sanctions on Iran were followed up with additional sanctions by both the US and the EU. 
Only when an embargo on Iranian oil exports was threatened in 2011 did the Iranians agree to new talks, but 
the possibility of war loomed, if diplomacy and pressure failed, fuelled by Israeli warnings that it might take 
unilateral action. However, the Obama administration was more inclined to pursue negotiations with Iran 
that the previous Bush administration and when Hassan Rohani was elected President of Iran in 2013 the 
stage was set for more serious negotiations in which the US acted in concert with the EU (represented by 
Ashton), plus Russia and China.  
In the meantime, the Arab world was overtaken by a series of popular uprisings that began in Tunisia in 
December 2010. 
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The Arab awakening 
The Europeans were caught off guard by the Tunisian revolt not least because they thought the secular 
Western-aligned government of Ben Ali was the exemplar of economic and gradual political reform advo-
cated by the EU. France initially contemplated bolstering Ben Ali, but when the Tunisian army refused to 
suppress mass demonstrations that combined all elements of the population, secular and Islamist, middle 
class and working class, France joined other Europeans in supporting the protesters. Within days of Ben 
Ali’s flight into exile in Saudi Arabia, on 25 January 2011, a revolution erupted in Egypt. 
Faced with the dilemma of whether to stand by Mubarak, its long-time ally, Washington wavered and 
the Europeans demurred, but when regime security forces turned violently on the demonstrators in Cairo’s 
Tahrir Square, broadcast live around the world, the Americans and the Europeans abandoned Mubarak. In 
any case, Mubarak’s fate was not in their hands. This was an Egyptian revolution and the army initially went 
along with the protesters, sacrificed Mubarak and set up an interim administration pending new elections 
that delivered a victory for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi. His administration antagonised 
many Egyptians but crucially the army, and Morsi was ousted in 2013 amid a more brutal crackdown on the 
Brotherhood than even Mubarak had countenanced. EU initiatives to give Morsi cautious support in the 
name of democracy were rendered irrelevant.6  
When the revolution spread to Libya in 2011, Qadhafi mobilized the armed forces to crush the rebels and 
both the UN and the LAS called for action. British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President 
Sarkozy grasped the moment to champion intervention. Germany initially opposed proposals for NATO to 
mount an air and naval operation, and only some NATO members participated in the campaign that led to 
the fall of Qaddafi. Washington chose to ‘lead from behind’. Yet toppling the regime proved easier than 
building a new one and by 2015 internal conflict had rendered Libya a no-go area for EU and US nationals. 
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The intervention in Libya did not set a precedent for action elsewhere in the region. The Europeans and 
Americans deferred to GCC mediation in Yemen, and, in the case of Bahrain, while criticizing the methods 
used by the rulers to suppress demonstrations, the Europeans stood aside.  When opponents of the Assad re-
gime in Syria faced increasingly harsh repression by government forces, the Europeans and Americans 
sought UN Security Council condemnation, but were thwarted by Russia and China. An LAS and UN-
initiated mediation effort subsequently foundered and civil war raged. 
European and US efforts to galvanise the Syrian opposition into a coherent fighting force foundered and 
anti-Assad Islamist militia gained in strength. By 2014 a new configuration of such forces, self-styled the 
Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (IS) had captured vast swathes of both northern Syria and Iraq. The 
US-trained and equipped Iraqi army crumbled, leaving only Kurdish and Iranian-backed Shia militia to push 
back. Appalled by the beheadings of kidnapped Westerners, broadcast by IS over the internet, and IS re-
cruitment of hundreds of Muslim volunteers from Europe, several European states sent forces to join in US-
led bombing raids on IS.  
Describing itself as a new caliphate, the IS has declared its intention to unravel the legacy of the British-
French ‘Sykes-Picot’ agreement that presaged the shape of the Arab state system in the Middle East for a 
century. To counter the IS and its ambitions, the Europeans have made common cause with a collection of 
Arab governments and Iran, none of which seek to uphold the values of human rights and democracy es-
poused by the Europeans since the demise of European imperialism. 
Conclusion 
Half a century on from the retreat of the European imperial powers from MENA, a brief interlude of US he-
gemony had also peaked and Europeans could only look on in consternation as the regional state system that 
they had devised in the 1920s looked set to unravel. The confidence with which the EU had sought to export 
its values and neo-liberal economic model in the 1990s had given way to anxiety in the face of Islamist-
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inspired terrorism at the turn of the century, and greater preoccupation with controlling immigration and 
countering ‘radicalization’ within Europe. 
Over the same period, the EU had become increasingly integrated into the economic fabric of the Middle 
East, both as aid donor and supplier of arms, infrastructure projects, and consumer goods. Europe remains 
the principle market for exports from the Middle East, and is dependent on energy supplies from North Afri-
ca and the Persian Gulf. Migration flows—of Jews from Europe into Israel, and of Arabs, Iranians, and 
Turks into Europe—bind the populations and politics of these two contiguous geographic regions. Yet this is 
not just a simple tale of harmonious interchange; there is ambivalence and friction with clear historical roots. 
European efforts to promote Arab–Israeli peace are an expression of Europe’s own security interests and 
ties on both sides of the divide, but there is little to show for EU engagement in the Israeli–Palestinian peace 
process, except the dependence of the Palestinian Authority on EU financial support. The EMP has been 
supplanted by the UfM and that has achieved little. The ENP and its action plans for Arab reform, inter-
twined with the deals done by the Europeans with Arab dictators to protect European security, did not ad-
dress the problems that led to the Arab uprisings, while the forces of political Islam, which the European had 
hoped to contain, are resurgent. 
Further reading 
Al-Fattal, R. (2010) European Union Foreign Policy in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Jerusalem: 
PASSIA) 
An explication of how EU dealings with the Palestinians were framed by EU instruments for relations 
across the Mediterranean. 
Basaran, T. (2008) ‘Security, Law, Borders: Spaces of Exclusion’, International Security Review, 2: 339–54  
An examination of how laws passed in the EU and agreements forged with Arab governments were used to 
Hollis, R (2016) ‘Europe in the Middle East’ Chapter in Louise Fawcett, ed., The International Re-
lations of the Middle East (Oxford & New York: OUP) 
Author’s pre-publication copy. To cite refer to published version. 
 
30 
control migration and asylum seekers. 
Bicci, F. and Gillespie, R. (eds) (2011) ‘Special Issue: The Union for the Mediterranean—Continuity or 
Change in Euro-Mediterranean Relations?’, Mediterranean Politics, 16 (1) 
A thorough examination of the genesis, parameters, and implications of EU initiatives for the Mediterrane-
an. 
Croft, S. (2012) Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) 
An examination of British constructions of ‘Britishness’, security and insecurity. 
Doty, R. (1996) Imperial Encounters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) 
A very readable introduction to the politics of representation in North-South discourse. 
Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A. (1995) Regionalism and World Politics: Regional Organisation and 
International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
A discussion of regionalism in theoretical and historical perspective, and its application in different con-
texts, including Europe and the Middle East, thereby providing a context within which to understand rela-
tions between the two. 
Fierke, K. M. (2007) Critical Approaches to International Security (Cambridge: Polity Press) 
A very useful detailed overview of critical theory approaches to specific issues in international relations. 
Gause, G. (2010) The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)  
In this work, Gause—a specialist on the politics of the Arab Gulf states—explores the idea of the Gulf as a 
‘regional system’. 
Hollis, R (2016) ‘Europe in the Middle East’ Chapter in Louise Fawcett, ed., The International Re-
lations of the Middle East (Oxford & New York: OUP) 
Author’s pre-publication copy. To cite refer to published version. 
 
31 
Owen, R. (2004) State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (revd edn, London and 
New York: Routledge) 
Points to how the European colonial legacy in the Middle East affected state-building and politics in the 
region. 
Radwan, S. and Reiffers, J.-L. (2005) The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 10 Years after Barcelona: 
Achievements and Perspectives (Paris: Institut de la Méditerranée) 
A report focusing on the economic aspects of the partnership, with input from Arab and European experts. 
Roy, O. (2004) Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst) 
A revealing analysis of the causes and implications of radicalization among young European Muslims, and 
relations between the West and the Muslim world. 
Teti, A. (2012) ‘The EU’s First Response to the ‘Arab Spring: a Critical Discourse Analysis of the Partnership 
for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’, Mediterranean Politics 17:3 266-84. 
This article provides a critical analysis of the initiative taken by the EU to re-work the ENP to support de-
mocratisation in the wake of the Arab uprisings. 
Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
An exposition of social theory from which to derive applications to the Middle East; useful specifically for 
understanding competing narratives about identity, states, regions, and society in this context. 
Youngs, R. (ed.) (2006) Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000–2006 (Madrid: FRIDE) 
A useful survey of individual and collective EU approaches to political (and economic) reform in the Mid-
dle East and other parts of the world. 
Hollis, R (2016) ‘Europe in the Middle East’ Chapter in Louise Fawcett, ed., The International Re-
lations of the Middle East (Oxford & New York: OUP) 
Author’s pre-publication copy. To cite refer to published version. 
 
32 
Notes 
1. For the texts of these documents, see Laqueur and Rubin (1995). 
2. Barcelona Declaration, 28 November 1995, available online at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/barcelona_declaration.pdf> 
3. See European Commission (2004). 
4. Venice Declaration 1980, Bulletin of the EC, 6–1980: 10–11, point 1.1.6. 
5. For sources, see Hollis (1997). 
6.  See Teti (2012). 
 
Questions: 
1.
 
Describe and analyse the legacy of European imperialism in the Middle East after 1971. 
2.
 
In what ways did the EU model the use of ‘soft power’ in its dealings with the Middle East after 
1992? 
3.
 
Analyse the role of the EU in the ‘Middle East Peace Process’. 
4.
 
Compare and contrast the usefulness of the EMP and the ENP in pursuing EU goals for the Mediter-
ranean neighbourhood. 
5.
 
What do European responses to the Arab uprisings reveal about Europe as a regional actor? 
 
 
